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Mr. Chairman, ranking member Tonko, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate 
the opportunity to testify today on “cooperative federalism,” the term used to describe the 
constitutional—and the political, policy, and legal—relationship between the federal and state 
governments with respect to environmental policies and law.  
I am a law professor at the University of Maryland Carey School of Law and the 
President of the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) (http://www.progressivereform.org/).  
Founded in 2002, CPR is a network of sixty scholars across the nation dedicated to protecting 
health, safety, and the environment through analysis and commentary. We have a small 
professional staff funded by foundations.  I joined academia mid-career, after working for the 
Federal Trade Commission for seven years and the House Energy and Commerce Committee for 
five years.  I was a lawyer for small, publicly-owned electric systems as a partner at Spiegel & 
McDiarmid, a mid-size law firm in Washington, D.C.  I have served as a consultant to the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on environmental justice issues and have testified 
before Congress many times.  My work on environmental regulation includes five books, and 
over thirty articles (as author or co-author).   My most recent book, published by the University 
of Chicago Press, is The People's Agents and the Battle to Protect the American Public: Special 
Interests, Government, and Threats to Health, Safety, and the Environment, co-authored with 
Professor Sidney Shapiro of Wake Forest University’s School of Law, which comprehensively 
analyzes the state of the regulatory system that protects public health, worker and consumer 
safety, and natural resources, and concludes that these agencies are under-funded, lack adequate 
legal authority, and consistently are undermined by political pressure motivated by special 
interests in the private sector.  This January, Cambridge University Press will publish my book 
entitled Why Not Jail: Industrial Catastrophes, Corporate Malfeasance, and Government 
Inaction. That book argues for more consistent and frequent enforcement of criminal laws at the 
federal and state levels when reckless behavior within corporations kill or injure workers or 
members of the public, or cause irreversible damage to the environment.  
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As I understand the situation, the Subcommittee’s leadership called this hearing in part to 
explore the contradiction between the notion that legislation to reauthorize the Toxics Substances 
Control Act (TSCA) should preempt any state authority to regulate chemical products with the 
notion that the federal government should depend on the states to regulate coal ash and has no 
role to play in protecting the public from such threats.  These positions are a dichotomy if there 
ever was one.  The contradictory ideas that the federal government must dominate the field in 
one area but that the state government should be exclusively in control in another seems 
irreconcilable as a matter of principle.   
Of course, as a practical matter, these irreconcilable positions have consistent pragmatic 
outcomes: they help big business.   The chemical industry feels much more confident about its 
ability to browbeat the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) into quiescence under the weak 
provisions of the TSCA legislation under discussion, so long as proactive states like California 
are knocked out of the equation.  The electric power industry is much happier submitting to state 
regulators, who, as the recent spill in North Carolina clearly illustrates, have done almost nothing 
to control the severe hazards of improper coal ash disposal than it would be dealing with EPA’s 
more stringent regulatory proposals.  Or, in other words, states should prevail as long as they 
aren’t doing much to gore the ox of big business.  Once they get started down the road to 
regulate more stringently, however, the federal government must step in to halt a “patchwork” of 
overly aggressive regulation. 
This debate has been going on, in one iteration or another, for decades.  Congress has 
grappled with it, the Supreme Court has grappled with it, the states have participated in the 
debate, as has the Executive Branch, and out of all this intense debate have come two 
fundamental principles well-recognized by mainstream constitutional scholars: 
One.  The wide range of federal programs dealing with health, safety, and the 
environment are grounded appropriately in the Commerce Clause.  While the Supreme 
Court has imposed some limits on federal authority, they do not apply to the structure of 
the federal environmental law.  
Two.  A coherent set of eminently reasonable principles defines the cooperative 
partnership that prevails in the health, safety, and environmental area, and I urge the 
subcommittee to return to these principles in allocating responsibility to federal and state 
governments. 
Constitutional Support for Cooperative Federalism 
 Despite a lot of arm waving by the poorly informed advocates of deregulation regarding 
the limits imposed on federal government power under the Commerce Clause and the states’ 
prerogatives under the Tenth Amendment, the very limited constraints imposed by the Supreme 
Court under these provisions have little relevance to the structure of U.S. environmental 
protection programs.  All of these programs divide responsibility between EPA and the states, 
with EPA setting standards and the states implementing such standards through permits and 
enforcement.  Participation by the states is voluntary: they apply for a “delegation” of authority 
from EPA to assume responsibility for a specific program, and receive in return that authority 
and, generally, some funding to support implementation.  If a state chooses not to apply, EPA 
implements the program on its own.  The vast majority of states have received delegations to 
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implement to vast majority of programs, however, for two reasons: first, the states recognize the 
value of the programs for their citizens and the natural resources within their borders and, 
second, they wish to operate as a full partner with EPA because they have strong incentives to 
reiterate their ability to govern.    
 Because they are proud, and because they are accustomed to a partnership that places 
them on an equal footing with EPA, states bitterly resent congressional efforts to preempt their 
authority.  I have attached to this testimony a recent letter addressed to Chairman Shimkus and 
Ranking Member Tonko opposing the preemption provisions of pending TSCA reauthorization 
legislation. 
 I have dealt with these issues for close to four decades, and I would look quite foolish if I 
pretended that EPA’s relationship with the states is nirvana.  Like any marriage, cooperative 
federalism is very difficult to sustain, takes constant vigilance, and sometimes breaks down into 
recrimination and resentment.  The states chafe at EPA’s bossiness and EPA is irate at their 
shortcomings. But it has been, quite literally, decades since anyone suggested that this 
relationship was not firmly grounded in the Constitution and, specifically, the Commerce Clause. 
 The most relevant case is New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992), which dealt with 
efforts to compel the State of New York (and other states) to take title to low-level nuclear waste 
generated within their borders if they failed to either provide enough disposal capacity to cover 
such wastes or entered into “regional compacts” with other states to build such facilities.  The 
Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments of 1985 offered three federal incentives for 
states to comply with these requirements: monetary awards, the ability to impose elevated 
charges on waste disposal from non-complying states, and the take title requirement.  The 
Supreme Court approved the first two incentives as consistent with congressional authority under 
the Commerce Clause, but held that Congress did not have constitutional authority to 
“commandeer” state resources and legal authority through the take title provision.  In the 22 
years since, no one has suggested that any of the federal environmental programs run afoul of 
that restriction. 
Principles for Dividing the Job 
Almost all federal environmental laws divide the job of controlling pollution between the 
federal government and the states. Some laws, such as the Clean Air Act, require the federal 
government to set the standards that sources of pollution must meet and tell the states to find a 
way to meet the standards through the crafting of State Implementation Plans (SIPs).  Under 
other statutes, such as the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(dealing with hazardous waste disposal), the federal government sets requirements for polluters 
and then allows states the option of running the day-to-day regulatory programs that implement 
these requirements. In this system, for example, states write pollution permits and bring 
enforcement actions against violators.   
The states are always free to adopt more stringent regulatory requirements if they wish to 
do so.  But no state program can adopt less stringent requirements.  In other words, these federal 
laws set a floor for safeguards, which states must at least meet but are free to exceed.  If, in the 
course of running its pollution control program, a state falls significantly short of the benchmarks 
established by EPA, EPA can withdraw the state’s authority to run the pollution program, and 
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instead run the program itself.  (In bureaucratic parlance, this action is called the “withdrawal of 
EPA’s delegation of authority.”) 
Congress embraced a strong federal role in pollution control because: 
1. Uniform national standards crafted by the nation’s “best and brightest” technical 
experts are efficient, avoiding the need to reinvent the wheel 50 times. 
2. All citizens should receive equal protection under the law—that is, everyone 
should be able to expect a minimal set of effective safeguards no matter what state 
they happen to live in. 
3. Businesses should compete on a level playing field, and by that I mean good 
actors should not be left at a competitive disadvantage relative to bad actors who 
do business in states that allow them to cut unacceptable corners on health, safety, 
and the environment. 
4. States would avoid a “race to the bottom” in competing for new industries. 
5. Pollution does not stop short at state lines and, in many places, strong federal laws 
are the only way to control so-called “transboundary pollution.” 
As I mentioned earlier, despite the clear need for a strong federal role in environmental 
protection, great tension is present in the world of cooperative federalism.  Obviously, states 
differ in their approach to environmental protection. Some do an outstanding job on specific 
programs – better, even, than the federal EPA. Other states are dreadfully deficient.  The result is 
that their citizens are exposed to far higher levels of harmful pollutants than the federal 
government deems safe.  States try to attract business by offering to relax environmental 
protections. State environmental agencies are increasingly starved for resources, making it 
difficult or even impossible to carry out their federal statutory mandates.  Some states lack not 
only resources but the political will to police local industries who threaten to move elsewhere if 
the regulatory climate is not “friendly” to business.  EPA also suffers from limited resources and, 
on occasion, a failure of political will, and has withdrawn or threatened to withdraw state 
delegations on only a handful of occasions.  Many states resent their federal partner, engaging in 
open rebellion against the “unfunded mandates” that are imposed on them by federal authorities. 
States and regulated industries also argue that “one-size-fits-all” regulation saps the economy.  
They bristle at tough national standards and fight to tailor regulations so they apply to “local 
conditions.” 
Equally as troubling, EPA has never made an effort to gather data or develop a template 
for the amount of resources states must commit to the implementation of federally-delegated 
programs.  The Agency does not have reliable information about the size of state budgets for 
such programs, and passively accepts the fact that such budgets are most often a product of a 
wide range of factors (e.g., population, economic health, local politics) that have absolutely 
nothing to do with the regulatory burden (e.g., number of regulated facilities, scope and depth of 
pollution problems, presence of nationally treasured natural resources) the state must support. 
Without such information, EPA cannot explain to the states in a fair and clear way what they 
must do to hold up their end of the delegation bargain. 
In short, cooperative federalism has hit two basic stumbling blocks.  EPA and the states 
do not have sufficient resources to implement federal environmental requirements.  We do not 
have basic information that would allow us to address problems with how the system is working.  
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Strong federal standard-setting and oversight is as important today as it was when Congress 
wrote cooperative federalism into pollution control statutes.  The weakening of federal authority 
harms public health and weakens environmental protection.  When the states fight unfunded 
mandates, they fail to acknowledge the fact that they would be responsible for protecting public 
health from the adverse effects of toxic pollutants; delivering clean drinking water; safeguarding 
precious natural resources; and curbing transboundary pollution whether or not the federal 
government played any role.  By the same token, when Congress disrespects the states by 
imposing preemption, especially in an area as important as the testing and oversight of toxic 
chemicals, the states are justifiably irate. 
 
Several years ago, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) 
recommended that EPA continue to devolve authority to the states, but that it adopt a system of 
“differential oversight,” whereby it would give leeway to high-performing states, but keep poor 
performers on a much shorter leash.  NAPA is generally conservative in its outlook, and made 
this recommendation as part of a study that was funded by Congress.  Despite initial enthusiasm 
for this proposal, EPA has never adopted it.  EPA is afraid to target poor state performers in 
public.   To address these problems: 
1. Congress and the Obama Administration should impose a system of accountable 
devolution, periodically evaluating the states and placing them into categories that reward 
good performance with federal deference but subject weaker state programs to more 
rigorous review.   
2. EPA should also develop a database that closely tracks existing spending and 
performance by states that are running federal environmental programs.   
3. EPA should develop guidelines for state environmental spending that reflect the 
regulatory burden state agencies must support.  EPA should have available teams of 
personnel able to take over the worst state programs on short notice, using a system of 
“deterrence-based withdrawal” to motivate states to improve. 
4. Congress must appropriate funding sufficient to allow EPA to make these reforms.  
It’s easy to write a law, and much harder to make sure it is implemented and enforced, 
fairly and aggressively, throughout our vast country.  Governments at all levels struggle to be 
effective and efficient, and must remain accountable to their citizens.  In areas as important as 
protecting public health and the environment, everyone – no matter where they live – deserves 
equal protection.  Making states responsible for delivering on this crucial goal is a key part of 
EPA’s mission. 
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April 17, 2014 
 
The Honorable John Shimkus 
Chairman 
Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy 
Committee on Energy and Commerce 
U.S. House of Representatives 
2452 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515 
 
The Honorable Paul Tonko 
Ranking Member 
Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy 
Committee on Energy and Commerce 
U.S. House of Representatives 
2463 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
 
 
Re: The Chemicals in Commerce Act Draft Bill 
 
 
Dear Chairman Shimkus and Ranking Member Tonko: 
 
We, the undersigned Attorneys General, write regarding the February 27, 2014, 
discussion draft bill entitled the Chemicals in Commerce Act (the “TSCA Discussion Draft”), 
which sets out possible amendments to the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2601 et seq. (“TSCA”).  
 
We join many stakeholders in state and federal government, industry, environmental and 
public health organizations, and scientific and academic communities in steadfastly supporting 
efforts to modernize TSCA.  The goal of TSCA is to establish an appropriate federal regulatory 
framework for preventing unnecessary risks of injury to public health and the environment from 
the manufacture and use of chemicals that present such risks.  We recognize the importance of 
achieving this goal and the critical contribution that TSCA should play in ensuring adequate 
protection of public health and the environment from toxic chemicals.  Unfortunately, in its 
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current form, TSCA has largely failed to accomplish its crucial purpose.  In fact, only a small 
handful of the approximately 84,000 registered industrial chemicals are currently subject to any 
federal regulations, and over 60,000 of the registered chemicals have not even been reviewed for 
safety as mandated by current law.   
 
While we applaud your Subcommittee’s interest in reforming TSCA and remedying its 
well-recognized shortcomings, we are deeply concerned about the TSCA Discussion Draft’s 
sweeping preemption of the authority of states to protect our citizens from the health and 
environmental risks posed by the production and use of toxic chemicals within the borders of our 
states.  The preemption provisions of the draft bill far exceed the preemption provisions currently 
in place under TSCA.  As discussed more fully below, for chemicals already in commerce, the 
TSCA Discussion Draft would preempt state regulation of a chemical once the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) took required action regarding that chemical.  For 
new chemicals, the TSCA Discussion Draft would preempt state regulation of a chemical 
irrespective of whether EPA took required action regarding that chemical.  In addition, the TSCA 
Discussion Draft would expand preemption to bar states from requesting health or safety 
information from a company regarding a toxic chemical once EPA has made a risk determination 
for that chemical. Thus, if enacted, the draft bill’s broad preemption language would effectively 
eliminate the existing federal-state partnership on the regulation of toxic chemicals by preventing 
states from continuing their successful and ongoing legislative, regulatory and enforcement work 
that has historically reduced the risks to public health and the environment posed by toxic 
chemicals. 
 
Our federal laws governing air and water pollution, hazardous waste and pesticides have 
successfully created a dynamic federal-state relationship in which the authority of states to enact 
and enforce human health and environmental protections is preserved and thus complements and 
enhances federal standards.  That paradigm should be preserved in any amended TSCA.  Thus, 
consistent with letters that some of the undersigned Attorneys General sent last summer to 
members of the Senate in connection with S. 1009, we support TSCA reform that would 
strengthen crucial protections of public health and safety, and the environment, while staunchly 
opposing any reform that would come at the expense of our states’ own ability to protect our 
citizens and environment from dangerous chemicals, where state action is required to do so.  
 
I. The States’ Important Role in Protecting Against the Risks Posed by Toxic 
Chemicals 
 
 The states’ responsibilities and powers under our federal system of government include 
exercising traditional police powers to protect public health and the environment.  Historically 
and currently, states have been leaders in acting to reduce risks to citizens’ health and to the 
environment from toxic chemicals, often acting before the federal government in this regard.  For 
example, Connecticut banned the manufacture and use of polychlorinated biphenyls, or PCBs, 
two years before EPA’s nationwide ban under TSCA.  California restricted the use of certain 
phthalates in children’s toys and childcare articles before such chemicals were federally 
restricted by the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, and restricted formaldehyde 
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emissions from composite wood products years before EPA regulated such products under 
TSCA.  And a number of states, including Iowa, Massachusetts, New York, Vermont, and 
Wisconsin, instituted broad bans of the toxic pesticide DDT before EPA outlawed non-
emergency uses of the chemical under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act in 
1972.   
 
Also, in recent years many state legislatures have introduced or adopted comprehensive 
chemical management bills, as well as phase-outs of toxic chemicals.  Protection of children’s 
health from harmful chemicals has been a particular focus of the states, and many state laws in 
the area of toxic chemicals have been enacted with strong bipartisan support.  See Exhibit A 
(providing examples of state toxics control laws); see also Safer States, Safer Chemicals, 
Healthy Families (Nov. 2010), available at 
www.saferchemicals.org/PDF/reports/HealthyStates.pdf. 
 
II. The Need for TSCA Reform 
 
Congress enacted TSCA in 1976 to give EPA authority to address the risks posed by the 
production and use of toxic chemicals.  But because of limitations in the statute, coupled with 
lack of adequate funding for implementation, TSCA has largely failed to fulfill its purpose.  As a 
result, our citizens and our environment continue to be exposed to the risks of potentially hazardous 
chemicals on an ongoing basis, many of which risks are not well understood.  As noted above, 
thousands of chemicals that have never been reviewed for safety are registered for use in the United 
States.   
 
We believe that strong state and federal efforts are needed to address the risks posed by 
toxic chemicals.  As explained in written testimony that the New York State Attorney General’s 
Office provided to this committee last September, it is important for Congress to amend TSCA to 
make it more protective of public health and the environment, and also important that any TSCA 
amendments not expand the preemption of state toxic chemical regulatory and enforcement 
efforts.  However, the preemption provisions of the TSCA Discussion Draft do just that:  they 
would eliminate the states’ role in toxic chemical regulation and therefore make TSCA less 
protective, not more. 
 
III. The TSCA Discussion Draft’s Preemption Provisions Imperil Needed Protection 
 
A. Preemption Under TSCA Currently 
 
The TSCA Discussion Draft proposes to greatly expand TSCA preemption, and would 
serve to cripple states’ ability to protect their citizens and the environment from the risks posed 
by toxic chemicals.  Currently, TSCA preempts state regulation only under limited 
circumstances.  TSCA section 18(a)(1)1 preserves state power to regulate a chemical substance, 
1  15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1). 
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a chemical mixture, or a chemical-containing article unless EPA prescribes a rule or order for the 
substance, mixture or article under TSCA sections 5 or 6.2   
 
Even if EPA does prescribe such a rule or order, that EPA action does not necessarily 
preempt state action.   If the state regulation is identical to the EPA rule or order, is adopted 
under the authority of any other federal law, or bans the use of the substance or mixture in the 
state, then EPA action does not preempt the state regulation.3   
 
In addition, even if the EPA rule or order would preempt a state requirement, TSCA 
gives a state the power to apply to EPA and obtain an exemption from preemption if the state 
regulation would not preclude compliance with the EPA regulation, would provide a 
significantly higher degree of protection than the EPA regulation, and would not unduly burden 
interstate commerce.4  Thus, under TSCA, states currently have significant power to regulate 
toxic chemical manufacture and use in ways that complement and enhance EPA’s efforts, as the 
examples of state action described above demonstrate. 
 
B. Preemption Under the TSCA Discussion Draft 
 
The TSCA Discussion Draft contains preemption provisions that, if enacted, would 
effectively eliminate the states’ power to regulate the manufacture and use of both existing and 
new toxic chemicals.  
 
Existing Chemicals.  Existing chemicals are those already listed in EPA’s inventory of 
chemicals under TSCA section 8(b).5  For an existing chemical that is actively in use, the TSCA 
Discussion Draft contemplates a three-step EPA process:  (1) EPA determines whether the 
chemical is “high priority” or “low priority;” (2) if the chemical is high priority, EPA makes a 
“safety determination” regarding whether the chemical poses an unreasonable risk of harm; and 
(3) if EPA finds that the chemical poses an unreasonable risk, EPA promulgates a rule 
establishing restrictions or requirements applicable to manufacture or use of the chemical.6  As a 
result, the TSCA Discussion Draft requires EPA to take one of the following three actions for 
each active existing chemical:  determine that the chemical is low priority; determine that the 
chemical is high priority but does not present an unreasonable risk; or determine that the 
chemical is high priority and presents an unreasonable risk, followed by promulgation of a rule 
to regulate manufacture or use of the chemical.   
 
2  15 U.S.C. §§ 2617(a)(2)(B), 2604, 2605. 
3  15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B). 
4  15 U.S.C. § 2617(b).   
5  15 U.S.C. § 2607(b). 
6  TSCA Discussion Draft § 6(a)(3) (proposing new subsection 6(a) regarding priority 
determinations, new subsections 6(b), (c), (d) and (e) regarding safety determinations, and new 
subsection (f) regarding rules setting requirements or restrictions). 
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Each of these three actions preempts states from “establish[ing] or continu[ing] in force” 
any law or regulation that “prohibits or restricts the manufacture, processing, distribution in 
commerce, or use of [the] chemical substance, mixture or article for its intended conditions of 
use.”7  Because the TSCA Discussion Draft requires EPA to take one of these three actions for 
each active existing chemical, all present and future state laws or regulations for each such 
chemical would eventually be preempted, except for state laws or regulations promulgated 
pursuant to other federal laws.8  
 
This is particularly troubling in the case of chemicals EPA has categorized as low 
priority.  Chemicals may be given that designation even though they pose either a high hazard or 
a high exposure.9  And the TSCA Discussion Draft does not require EPA to take any further 
action on a low-priority chemical.10  Thus, states would be preempted from protecting their 
citizens from chemicals that pose either a high hazard or a high exposure that EPA never 
regulates.   
 
New Chemicals.  For new chemicals, once a company has submitted a notification to 
EPA, the TSCA Discussion Draft contemplates a similar two-step process:  (1) EPA determines 
whether the chemical poses an unreasonable risk of harm; and (2) if EPA finds that the chemical 
poses an unreasonable risk, EPA promulgates a rule establishing restrictions or requirements 
applicable to manufacture or use of the chemical.11   
 
Under the TSCA Discussion Draft’s preemption provision, both of these steps for new 
chemicals have the same preemptive effect as the three steps for existing chemicals, so no state 
could “establish or continue in force” any law or regulation governing the “manufacture, 
processing distribution in commerce, or use” of a new chemical.12  Moreover, EPA’s failure to 
make an unreasonable risk determination within 90 days also preempts states from establishing 
or continuing in force any such regulations.13  Accordingly, since one of these events would 
7  TSCA Discussion Draft § 17 (proposing new subsections 18(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iii) and (iv)). 
8  TSCA Discussion Draft § 17 (proposing new subsection 18(b) setting out exception to 
preemption limited to state laws adopted or authorized pursuant to other federal law).   
9  TSCA Discussion Draft § 6(a)(3) (proposing new subsection 6(a)(1)(B), pursuant to 
which EPA may designate a chemical with a potential for either a high hazard or a high exposure 
as low priority). 
10  TSCA Discussion Draft § 6(a)(3) (proposing new subsection 6(a)(5)). 
11  TSCA Discussion Draft § 5(a) (proposing new subsection 5(c)(3) & (5) regarding 
safety determinations and rules setting requirements or restrictions). 
12  TSCA Discussion Draft § 17 (proposing new subsections 18(a)(2)(A)(i) & (iii)).   
13  TSCA Discussion Draft § 17 (proposing new subsection 18(a)(2)(B), which cross-
references the 90-day period under new subsection 5(c)(1)).   
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occur for each new chemical, all present and future state laws or regulations for each such 
chemical would be preempted, even where EPA failed to act as mandated by law.14 
 
State Authority to Obtain Information.  The TSCA Discussion Draft also would expand  
preemption of state authority into a new arena: the ability of states to obtain health or safety 
information about toxic chemicals.15  Even if EPA has not sought such information, the TSCA 
Discussion Draft would preempt states from seeking such information if EPA has made a safety 
determination.16  But states may have good grounds to seek additional information regarding the 
health or safety implications of a particular chemical even if EPA has determined that a chemical 
does not present an unreasonable risk, and especially if EPA has determined that a chemical does 
present an unreasonable risk.  Information concerning the toxicity of chemicals develops over 
time, and states should not be foreclosed from obtaining safety information merely because EPA 
previously made a determination regarding the chemical’s safety.  This would represent a 
significant step backward in the realm of the “right to know” about toxic chemicals.  
 
Elimination of Exemptions from Preemption.  In addition to expanding the scope of 
preemption, the TSCA Discussion Draft eliminates two of the three current categorical 
exemptions from preemption, namely, if the state regulation (1) is identical to the EPA rule or 
order or (2) prohibits the use of the substance or mixture in the state.17  Without the first of those 
deleted exemptions, the only means for states to enforce EPA’s toxic chemical restrictions would 
be by citizen suit in federal court, which would deprive states of the critical tool of enforcement 
by state administrative agencies, the first line enforcers in most states.  Removal of the second 
exemption deprives state residents of additional state-law protection against toxic chemicals 
when their legislatures or administrative agencies have found sufficient basis to support an in-
state ban.  
 
Moreover, the TSCA Discussion Draft eliminates the states’ power to obtain exemptions 
from preemption on a case-by-case basis under TSCA section 18(b).18  Thus, states would no 
longer be able to obtain such exemptions, even if the state regulation would provide a 
significantly higher degree of protection and would not burden interstate commerce.   
 
14  As with existing chemicals, state laws or regulations regarding new chemicals 
promulgated pursuant to other federal laws would not be preempted.  TSCA Discussion Draft 
§ 17 (proposing new subsection 18(b)). 
15  TSCA currently preempts states from establishing or continuing in effect requirements 
for testing a chemical for health and safety effects if EPA has promulgated a rule requiring such 
testing for similar purposes, 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(A), but this provision does not preempt more 
general requests for health and safety information from states. 
16  TSCA Discussion Draft § 17 (proposing new subsection 18(a)(1)(B)).   
17  See 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B) (existing exemptions). 
18  15 U.S.C. § 2617(b). 
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IV. The TSCA Discussion Draft’s Potentially Grave Impact on State Toxic Chemical 
Regulation 
 
The TSCA Discussion Draft’s preemption provisions would eliminate states’ ability to 
exercise their power to protect their citizens and environment from the dangers of toxic 
chemicals.  Innovative state laws often result in better regulation and more safeguards, especially 
for vulnerable groups such as children and pregnant women.  As noted above, many states have 
enacted bans or restrictions on the use of toxic chemicals in toys or other items intended for use 
by, or in households with, children.  The preemption provisions of the TSCA Discussion Draft 
would preempt these important exercises of the states’ traditional police powers.   
 
State initiatives have also served as templates for national standards.  States have a long 
history of enforcement of toxic chemical regulatory requirements and contribute a nationwide 
network of experienced enforcement staff.  State regulation and enforcement have not prevented 
the United States from maintaining its leadership in chemical research and manufacturing, but 
have helped reduce risk to adults, children and the environment from the manufacture and use of 
toxic substances. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Achieving TSCA’s goal of protecting public health and the environment from toxic 
chemicals is critically important.  Preserving the dynamic federal-state relationship that relies on 
the authority of states to enact and enforce their own protections against those chemicals is a key 
part of that effort as it complements and enhances TSCA as well as our other national laws 
governing air and water pollution, hazardous waste, and pesticides.  
 
Accordingly, while we support efforts to improve TSCA, we oppose TSCA reform 
legislation that includes broad state preemption or otherwise expands the preemptive effect of 
TSCA.  We believe that, rather than bringing TSCA closer to attaining its goal, such provisions 
would move that goal further out of reach. 
 
We would welcome the opportunity to work with your Subcommittee to craft legislation 
that provides much-needed TSCA reforms, while preserving the traditional and critical role of 
states in protecting the health and welfare of their citizens and natural resources. 
 
We thank you for your consideration of our concerns.   
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Sincerely, 
 
Eric T. Schneiderman 
New York State Attorney General 
 
Martha Coakley 
Massachusetts Attorney General 
 
Kamala D. Harris 
California Attorney General 
 
Joseph A. Foster 
New Hampshire Attorney General 
 
George Jepsen 
Connecticut Attorney General 
 
Gary King 
New Mexico Attorney General 
 
David M. Louie 
Hawaii Attorney General 
 
Ellen F. Rosenblum 
Oregon Attorney General 
 
Thomas J. Miller 
Iowa Attorney General 
 
William H. Sorrell 
Vermont Attorney General 
 
Janet T. Mills 
Maine Attorney General 
 
Bob Ferguson 
Washington State Attorney General 
 
Douglas F. Gansler 
Maryland Attorney General  
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cc: The Honorable Frederick S. Upton 
    Chairman, House Energy and Commerce Committee 
 The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 
    Ranking Member, House Energy and Commerce Committee 
 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT A 
 
EXAMPLES OF EXISTING STATE REGULATION OF 
CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES 
 
CALIFORNIA 
 
1. Statewide ban on certain brominated flame retardants used largely in home 
furnishings (California Health and Safety Code § 108922). 
 
2. Limits on the use of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in consumer products – 
a significant cause of ozone pollution, which contributes to high rates of asthma in California 
(California Code of Regulations, title 17, § 94509). 
 
3. Statewide restrictions on six types of phthalate plasticizers used in toys and 
childcare articles (California Health and Safety Code §§ 108935-108939). 
 
4. Formaldehyde emission standards for composite wood products (California Code 
of Regulations, title 17, §§ 93120-93120.12). 
 
5. Proposition 65, a “right to know” law, which has led many manufactures to 
reformulate their products to reduce levels of toxic chemicals, including the reduction of lead in 
children’s bounce houses, playground structures and play and costume jewelry. 
 
6. The state’s Green Chemistry Program, a new and innovative set of laws designed 
to encourage companies to find safer alternatives for the toxic chemicals currently in their 
products (Hazardous Materials and Toxic Substances Evaluation and Regulation, Statutes 2008, 
chapter 559 (A.B. 1879); Toxic Information Clearinghouse, Statues 2008, chapter 560 
(S.B.509)). 
 
 
CONNECTICUT 
 
1. Regulation of cadmium in children’s jewelry (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-12d). 
 
2. Prohibition on consumer products with nickel-cadmium batteries (Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 22a-256b). 
 
3. Prohibition on sale of zinc-carbon batteries (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-256e). 
 
4. Limits on sale of packaging components composed of lead, cadmium, mercury, or 
hexavalent chromium (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 22a-255g et seq.). 
 
5. Prohibition on bisphenol A in reusable food containers (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-
12b). 
 
6. Prohibition on bisphenol A in thermal receipt paper (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-12e).  
 
 
 
IOWA 
 
1. Ban on sale, distribution, or offering for retail sale of certain household alkaline 
manganese batteries (Iowa Code §§ 455D.10A(2)(a) and (b)). 
 
2. Restrictions on the sale, distribution, or offering for retail sale of rechargeable 
consumer products powered by nickel-cadmium or lead batteries (Iowa Code § 455D.10B(1)). 
 
3. Ban on the sale, offer for sale, purchase, or use of plastic foam packaging 
products manufactured with chlorofluorocarbons or halogenated chlorofluorocarbons (Iowa 
Code § 455D.14). 
 
4. Restrictions on offering for sale certain mercury switch thermostats (Iowa Code 
§ 455D.16(6)). 
 
5. Restrictions on the sale, distribution, or offering for promotional purposes a 
package or packaging component which contains lead, cadmium, mercury, or hexavalent 
chromium (Iowa Code § 455D.19(3)). 
 
 
MARYLAND 
 
1. Regulation of products with brominated flame retardants (Md. Code Ann., Envir. 
§6-1202). 
 
2. Ban on manufacture and sale of lead-containing children’s products (Md. Code 
Ann., Envir. § 6-1303). 
 
3. Regulation of cadmium in children’s jewelry (Md. Code Ann., Envir. § 6-1402). 
 
 
MASSACHUSETTS 
 
1. Ban under the MA Mercury Management Act (Ch. 190 of the Acts of 2006, 
amending MA General Laws Ch. 21H), on the sale of certain mercury-added products, such as, 
without limitation and subject to certain exemptions: thermostats; barometers; flow meters; 
hydrometers; mercury switches; and mercury relays (310 C.M.R. 75.00). 
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2. Regulation of certain lacquer sealers and flammable floor finishing products, 
including clear lacquer sanding sealers (MA General Laws Ch. 94, § 329). 
 
3. The state’s comprehensive chemicals management scheme that requires 
companies that use large quantities of particular toxic chemicals to evaluate and plan for 
pollution prevention, implement management plans if practical, and annually measure and report 
the results (MA General Laws Ch. 21I). 
 
4. MA General Laws Ch. 94B Hazardous Substances Act, providing for ban of any 
toy, or other article intended for use by children, which contains a hazardous substance 
accessible to a child, or any hazardous substance intended or packaged in a form suitable for use 
in households (105 C.M.R. 650.000). 
 
 
NEW YORK 
 
1. Ban on bisphenol A in child care products (N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§  37-0501 
et seq.). 
 
2. Ban on the flame retardant tris(2-choloroethyl) phosphate (TRIS) in child care 
products (N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 37-0701 et seq.). 
 
3. Restrictions on the concentration of brominated flame retardants in products 
(N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 37-0111). 
 
4. Restrictions on the use of lead, cadmium, mercury, or hexavalent chromium in 
product packaging (N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 37-0205 et seq.).   
 
5. A ban on the import, sale or distribution of gasoline containing methyl tertiary 
butyl ether (MBTE) (N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 192-g). 
 
6. Restrictions on the phosphorus content of household cleaning products, and on the 
sale and use of phosphorus lawn fertilizers (N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 17-2103, 
35-0105(2)(a)). 
 
7. A de facto ban on the use of n-propyl bromide in dry cleaning; New York will not 
issue an air facility registration to any facility proposing to use n-propyl bromide as a dry 
cleaning solvent (New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, Approved Alternative Solvents 
for Dry Cleaning, at http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/72273.html).   
 
 
OREGON 
 
1. Ban on any product containing more than one-tenth of one percent by mass of 
pentabrominated diphenyl ether, octabrominated diphenyl ether and decabrominated diphenyl 
ether, flame retardant chemicals (ORS 453.085(16)). 
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2. Ban on art and craft supplies containing more than one percent of any toxic 
substance, as identified on a list of hazardous substances promulgated by rule (ORS 453.205 to 
453.275). 
 
3. The Oregon Health Authority (“OHA”) may ban from commerce products that 
contain hazardous substances that OHA concludes are unsafe, even with a cautionary label, and 
can ban toys or other articles intended for use by children that make a hazardous substance 
susceptible to access by a child (ORS 453.055). 
 
4. Ban on mercury use in fever thermometers, novelty items, certain light fixtures, 
and commercial and residential buildings (exceptions not referenced; ORS 646.608, 646A.080, 
646A.081, and 455.355). 
 
 
VERMONT 
 
1. Ban on lead in consumer products (9 Vt. Stat. Ann § 2470e-1). 
 
2. Ban on brominated and chlorinated flame retardants (9 Vt. Stat. Ann. §§ 2972-
2980). 
 
3. Ban on phthalates (18 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 1511). 
 
4. Ban on bisphenol A (9 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 1512). 
 
5. Ban on heavy metals in packaging (10 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 6620a). 
 
6. Comprehensive mercury management (10 Vt. Stat. Ann. ch. 164). 
 
7. Ban on addition of gasoline ethers (including MTBE) to fuel products (10 Vt. 
Stat. Ann. § 577). 
 
 
WASHINGTON 
 
1. Ban on the manufacture; distribution or sale of certain products containing 
polybrominated diphenyl ethers (Wash. Rev. Code § 70.76). 
 
2. Ban on the sale or distribution of sports bottles, or children’s bottles, cups, or 
containers that contain bisphenol A (Wash. Rev. Code § 70.280). 
 
3. Ban on distribution or sale of children’s products containing lead, cadmium and 
phthalates above certain concentrations (Wash. Rev. Code § 70.240). 
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4. Ban on the sale or distribution of certain products containing mercury (Wash. 
Rev. Code § 70.95M.050). 
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